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RIV'JW OF RC]ENT DUCISIONS
PATENT-THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PATENT FRAN-
CHISE.
M., the owner of a patent on a mold for maling burial vaults, assigned
the patent-right for a portion of Virginia to R., the plaintiff; also he assigned
the patent for Maryland to H. Defendant purchased one of the molds in
Maryland from H, and took it into plaintiff's territory, where he used it. Held
there was no infringemennt of ithe patent. Russell v. Tilghman (1921, D. C.
Va.) 275 Fed. 235.
The law thus declared is thoroughly settled. Indeed, since the leading case
of Adams v. Burks (1873) 17 Wall 453 (which presents every feature of the
case decided), patent owners have generally ceased to apportion the franchise
territorially. Adams v. Burks, supra, was reaffirmed and followed in Hobble
v. Jennison (1893) 149 U. S. 355; Keller v. Folding Bed Company (1895)
157 U. S. 659; Bauer v. O'Donnell (1913) 229 U. S. 1; Motion Picture Pat-
ents Company v. Film Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 502.
But this result has been reached with much difficulty and always (except
in Hobtie v4 Jennison, supra) by a closely dvided court. The question in-
volved is a phase of a much larger one, which the courts'have been unable to
settle.
The larger question is ths: What is the nature and scope of the patent-
right? Does it create in the patent owner a right to make, use and sell the
patented article, which right is sanctioned by the ,National Government? Or
does it merely give hin the right to exclude others from so doing by means, of
i.fringment suits in the Federal Courts? The question is of great import-
anc For, if the patent affirmatively confers upon the owner a right to make,
use and sell, which right is sanctioned by the Federal Government, then such
owner is not ameabe to either Federal or State anti-monopoly statutes; he
may make contracts, enter into trade combinations and conspiracies that would
clearly violate such statutes except for the patent. This view of the; patent-
right is declared in Dick v. Henry (1912) 224 U. S. I (decided by a vote of 4
to 3 of the Justices).
The other view, namely that there is a clear distinction between "the rights
Mich are given to the inventor by the patent law and which he may assert
against all the world through an infringement proceeding, and rights which he
ay reate for himself by private contract, which, however, are subject to the
rules of general, as distinguished from those of the patent, law,"-is declared
in the Motion Picture Patents case, supro (decided by a divided court) which
expressly overrules Dick v. Henry. But in United States v. United States
Shoe Machinery Co. (1918) 247 U. S. 32, the court by a division of 4 to 3, re-
instated the principle of Dick v. Henry, and held that monopoly contracts affect-
ing the use of patented machines do not come within the purview of the Sher-
man Act. In the present state of the law, it is impossible authoritatively to
define the nature and scope of the patent-right. No dout this difficulty is
largely attributable to the incorporeal nature of the patent-right. Lawyers and
143
Washington University Open Scholarship
144 9T. LODU LAW ZNYIZW
eve judges am hde to owulook this rcumstance and to deal wih a pat-
eated artide as thoug the article itsef i some way embodies the icmpomI
right- This diffculty was lov ago recogized in Hogg v. Emvo (18W)
6 How. at 4M whee the Court hscscrie the patent law as the most
aphical bnds of modem law.!
The opposg views of the ruture of the peent-rit have competed for
swemacy at lam since IM Congrew has by the Clayton Act adopt the
view sa forth by the majority the Motion Picture Cae, asra The
construcion of thi s i &e aspect noted is due to come befor, the cow
tn JaMMYo 19.2
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